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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF I JTAH, : 
PI a i nt i f f / Appel 1 ee f : 
1
 r : 
RODNEY JAMES SCHEEL, : Case No. 910012 
Priority No 2 
Defendant/Appellant i 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on thi s Court pursuant: to Utah 
Code Ann . § ' 8 - 2 • 2 (3 ) (i ) (19 8 7 & Supp 1 9 9 0) , wher eby a cie f endai it i i I 
a criminal case may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final 
judgment and conviction for a first degree felony. Mr. Rodney J. 
Scheel was convicted of Aggravated Ax- i :.-* ;..:*-:- , .-.• : n 
violation of -Jtah Code Ann. § 76-6-3 0 (1990), ir tl;*? Thirj Jud-Oia: 
District Cour t: in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes are found 
Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-101 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 
Utah Code Ann, $ 7 8-2-2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was there enough evidence to support the aggravated 
arson conviction? "In order to upset a conviction for insufficiency 
of the evidence, a defendant must show that reasonable minds must 
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt." 
State v. Linden, 666 P.2d 875 (Utah 1983) (per curiam). 
2. When two statutes prohibit the same conduct but 
impose different penalties, on appeal should this Court vacate the 
greater statutory conviction and remand for resentencing with 
instructions to enter a conviction pursuant to the other equally 
applicable statute? This Court "may correct an illegal sentence 
. . . at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Babbel, 157 
Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Utah 1991). "Whether a statute applies to a 
particular set of facts is a question of law.' State v. Waite, 803 
P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Aggravated Arson, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-103 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge, presiding. On July 6, 1990, a jury convicted 
Rodney Scheel of the charge stated above. Record [hereinafter "R"] 
at 65. Following a 90 day evaluation by the division of 
corrections, (R 75), the trial court continued the sentencing 
proceedings until December 10, 1990. (R 84). 
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Oii December 10, 1990, the court granted K Scheel ^ 
motion to enter a judgment of convicti on f\ * * gory 
of offense and imposed sentence accordingly r '\e O J T 
sentenced the defendant/appellant to an indeterminate term, of one to 
fifteen years ,3 n the Utah State Prison and a"L; ••: J<- :-^ , to |: >ay 
various court ordered amounts of fines and restitution, (R 8 5)• 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about November 26, 1989, Rodney Scheel returned to 
Sal t Lake Ci ty 1 1 1 the J ate evening hours following a brief stay in 
New Prague, Minnesota. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, dated 
July -,, 199G [hereinafter "Rtl 00"] at 278, 283. Mr. Scheel had 
. • .ty* .,- *r*;*•-< • * iwo weeks, visiting his mother, a 
sister, and >,,* ^ 7R T*\$ v/ork schedule and a 
traffic matter prompted Rodney' return. >-\r Transcript 
of Tridl Pn- . : 1 J ,1**. ".e:'<-matter "R;y^': -r- 91. 
Unable t*.. locate liu wile, Jil. Rodney took a cab t rom 
the airport to 3595 South 700 East, .**.;' mobile trailer home. 
R: ] 0 0 at 28 3"" 84, 3 04 When Re »di ley < * + - , he 
discovered that Jill had moved out* R:l 00 at 2:85, Rodney and J ill 
had problems domestically, even to the pod nt of filing divorce 
papers, but they a] ways managed to reso] ve 'matters and reconci ] e 
amicably. R:99 at 70; RilOO at 280-81 In fact, immediately after 
Jill had filed for divorce, she agreed to get "back together [with 
Rodney] tc • tr ;r tc > wor ) ;: out [tl iei r d i fferei ices] " Ri 99 at ; '0 They 
lived together again and went "house hunting" thereafter. R:99 
at 82. Mindful of their past reconciliations, Rodney attempted to 
find his wife through a friend. He also checked his answering 
service for messages before retiring for the evening. R:100 at 286. 
Prior to "settling in," however, Rodney had to counter 
the cold winter temperatures by lighting the furnace. R:100 
at 287. Jill left on the utilities but since the furnace had gone 
out, the trailer's interior remained cold. R:100 at 285, 287. 
The furnace had malfunctioned before. R:99 at 87. Jill 
Scheel admitted that the furnace was "as old as 22 years[,]" and it 
needed parts and servicing on a regular basis. R:99 at 87. In 
addition to annual winter "check ups" by the "gas man," R:99 at 92, 
the furnace was relit on at least two prior occasions in the past 
four years. R:99 at 87. No maintenance check had been made 
immediately before the fire, though, with Ms. Scheel telling fire 
investigators that 12 to 18 months may have elapsed since the 
furnace was last repaired. R:100 at 242. Her estimates varied 
during the trial and she ultimately conceded that she could not 
"recall exactly when [she] had the gas man out there [last for 
maintenance]." R:99 at 87. 
The State's witnesses acknowledged that a layperson would 
have difficulties lighting the furnace. R:99 at 65, 123. Rodney 
Scheel, unfamiliar with the functioning of the furnace, twisted some 
paper together, lit the end, and inserted it into the hole of the 
furnace. R:100 at 289. He turned the furnace's control knob to the 
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"pilot" position and depressed a button in order to light the pilot 
light. R:100 at 288-89. 
Unexpectedly, a burst of fire ignited, causing minor 
injuries to Rodney's hand and singeing his hair. R:100 at 289. He 
went to the bathroom and soaked his hand in water for a few 
minutes. R:100 at 289. Upon his return, he discovered that a fire 
was ablaze on the shag carpet by the base of the furnace. R:100 
at 289, 314. Rodney had accidentally dropped the lit paper in front 
of the furnace on his way to the bathroom. 
Rodney attempted to smother the fire with a small curtain 
from a nearby window. R:100 at 291. The fire quickly grew out of 
control, however, in the tight confines of the mobile home. R:100 
at 291. He escaped out of the trailer and ran for help. Receiving 
no response after banging relentlessly on his neighbors7 doors, 
Scheel stopped a passing motorist and requested assistance. R:100 
at 291-93. He then returned to the trailer where he awaited the 
police and fire departments. R:100 at 293 * 
Once the fire was extinguished, Rodney spoke briefly with 
Russell Westwood, a fire lieutenant who had responded to the scene. 
Rodney responded fully to all of Westwood's questions. R:99 at 55. 
Scheel also explained what had happened to Frank Brown, a fire 
battalion chief. R:100 at 296. No actions were then taken to 
arrest Mr. Scheel. R:99 at 55; R:100 at 240. The damage to the 
mobile trailer home amounted to $4,500. (R 85). 
The State's case-in-chief focused primarily on how a 
proper functioning furnace should work. In short, if a properly 
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functioning furnace would not have operated in the manner stated by 
Mr. Scheel, the fire could not have been accidental. As discussed 
below, however, even if a furnace operates in a manner consistent 
with the testimony of the State's witnesses, the State presented no 
evidence showing that the Scheel's furnace had in fact functioned 
properly. The Scheel's malfunctioning furnace could have 
ciccidentally caused the fire. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State did not prove that Rodney Scheel intentionally 
and unlawfully caused a fire. A fire did occur but it was 
accidental. Even when the evidence is viewed in a light most 
favorable to a verdict, the State could only speculate on how the 
fire had started and whether the Scheel's furnace had malfunctioned 
or operated in a manner consistent with his testimony. 
Alternatively, even if the evidence was sufficient, 
Rodney Scheel should have received the lesser penalty accompanying 
one of two potentially applicable statutes. The elements of "arson" 
and "aggravated arson" both prohibit the alleged conduct in an 
identical manner. Although Mr. Scheel was not sentenced properly 
during the lower court proceedings, he now respectfully requests 
this Court to correct his illegal sentence pursuant to the "Shondel" 
doctrine. See State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 
(1969); Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (this Court "may correct an illegal 




THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON 
"To successfully attack the verdict, an appellant must 
marshall all the evidence supporting the verdict and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support 
it." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); accord 
Cambelt Intern. Corp, v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 n.l (Utah 
1987). "A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire 
or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages . . . a 
habitable structure[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103. 
Following the State's case-in-chief Rodney Scheel moved 
to dismiss, arguing that the State had not proven its prima facie 
case. R:100 at 258. Mr. Scheel made a similar motion following the 
presentation of his defense. R:100 at 333. He stressed that the 
element of intent was missing due to the accidental occurrences 
leading up to the fire. The parties did not dispute that a fire had 
damaged a mobile trailer home. 
For purposes of argument, Mr. Scheel concedes that the 
mechanisms of an ordinary furnace would prevent it from lighting a 
curtain a fair distance away. Nevertheless, the evidence did not 
establish that the Scheel's furnace functioned in a manner 
consistent with a normal furnace. R:99 at 122, 179. Indeed, the 
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State did not disprove Rodney Scheel's affirmative defense that the 
fire was accidental. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 n.7 (Utah 
1981) ("Unlike some other jurisdictions, Utah imposes on the 
prosecution the burden to disprove the existence of affirmative 
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has produced 
some evidence of the defense"); State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 642 
(Utah 1983); State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah App. 1990). 
The State's witnesses admitted that part of the Scheel7s 
furnace was "just too badly heat damaged to be able to determine 
anything." R:99 at 122, 146, 180. No tests were actually performed 
on Scheel's furnace; the State made only visual observations. R%99 
at 64, 102, 121-22, 130, 148. Moreover, since the State was unable 
to ascertain the furnace's model number, its date of manufacture, 
its degree of functioning, or its condition, R:99 at 64, 122, 177, 
the testing done on "functionally similar" models (containing 
different parts) was speculative at best. R:99 at 172-73. State 
testimony concerning how a furnace is "suppose to function," a "best 
case scenario" not proven to exist with the Scheel's furnace, is 
inapposite here. R:99 at 179. 
The State also emphasized that the furnace's control knob 
was in the "on" position. R:99 at 114, 145. On a properly 
functioning furnace, the State argued, the pilot light could not be 
lit unless the knob is in the "pilot" position. R:99 at 145. But 
see R:100 at 306. Again, even if the mechanisms of a hypothetical 
furnace were so limited, the State did not prove that the old Scheel 
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furnace had not (mal)functioned differently. After the fire, the 
State was simply unable to rule out a malfunction or determine which 
parts needed to be replaced. R:100 at 243. The State did not know 
what ignited the fire, how it was fueled, and what combustible 
material was involved. R:100 at 226-27. 
The likelihood of a "small flash" inside the furnace, a 
possibility acknowledged by the State, R:99 at 126, 173, provided 
further support for Mr. Scheel's explanation. After Rodney inserted 
the burning paper into the furnace, a flash ignited briefly and 
singed Rodney's hair. Shocked and startled, Scheel accidentally 
dropped the burning paper on his way to the bathroom. R:99 at 124; 
R:100 at 289. Having dropped the paper near the base of the 
furnace, the shag carpet caught on fire and quickly spread out of 
control. R:100 at 314. Rodney tried unsuccessfully to smother the 
fire with a curtain. R:100 at 313. 
A complete breakdown of the furnace was unnecessary for 
these events to occur. Rather, if, as the State conceded, a small 
amount of gas could have been available for igniting the "flash,11 
R:99 at 178-79, nothing more than bad luck factored into the fire. 
A fire fighter on the scene noticed no wounds on Rodney, 
although the fireman admitted that during his own career, he also 
suffered burns which did not require treatment. R:99 at 62-63. 
Rodney similarly declined offers of medical assistance. R:100 
at 294. 
Mr. Scheel concedes that a "flash" did not ignite a 
curtain a fair distance away from the furnace. Thus, fire 
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lieutenant Russell Westwood properly found unacceptable how a "flame 
[c]ould shoot out at an angle and catch curtains on fire that far 
away [across the hallway]." R:99 at 54* Westwood's suspicions, 
however, misinterpreted Scheel's statements. 
The fire burned the curtain only after Rodney had pulled 
it from the window in his attempt to smother the flames in front of 
the furnace. R:100 at 291. His explanation accords the "V pattern" 
burning observed inside the trailer. Damage based near the front of 
the furnace extended upward towards the ceiling in the shape of a 
"V." R:99 at 195, 199; R:100 at 207. The physical evidence 
supported Mr. Scheel's testimony. 
Instead of seeking clarification for his concerns, 
Westwood simply maintained his conclusory suspicions without giving 
Rodney an opportunity to explain. R:99 at 50-51. A few follow up 
questions would have resolved how a curtain "off to the side might 
have caught fire[.]" R:99 at 56. Relying on unsubstantiated 
hearsay statements, particularly the account of battalion chief 
Frank Brown (a State witness unavailable at trial for purposes of 
cross examination, R:100 at 216, 218), proved incorrect. 
Rodney Scheel did not light a fire out of anger towards 
his wife. The two had reconciled in the past and Rodney hoped to 
reconcile again. R:100 at 286. A protective order had been issued 
against Rodney, but he knew nothing about it. R:100 at 303, 
Furthermore, Ms. Scheel admitted that she "never thought [Rodney] 
would hurt [her, and obtained it only so] he wouldn't want to hurt 
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[her].11 R:99 at 72 (emphasis added). Rodney may have been saddened 
and surprised by Jill's departure, yet he always maintained his 
composure. R:100 at 302. 
The above evidence reflected nothing more than unfounded 
suspicions, left unexplained by the State's investigators. The 
opinions of the State witnesses were based improperly on dissimilar 
test results and failed to establish how the Scheel's furnace had 
functioned. The evidence was insufficient on the element of intent; 
the State did not prove that Rodney Scheel had intentionally set a 
fire. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT SHOULD BE RESENTENCED, WITH A NEW JUDGMENT OF 
CONVICTION ENTERED FOR THIRD DEGREE ARSON PURSUANT TO THE 
SHONDEL DOCTRINE. 
Assuming, arguendo, the evidence was sufficient, the 
aggravated arson conviction should nonetheless be reversed and 
vacated, with judgment entered instead for the lesser charge of 
arson. As discussed below, since the "arson" and "aggravated arson" 
statutes both prohibited the conduct alleged here, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-6-102(1) (b), 76-6-103(1) (a), the Shondel doctrine entitled 
Rodney Scheel to receive the lesser of two potentially applicable 
punishments. State v. Shondel. 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969). 
"A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of 
fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages . . . a 
habitable structure[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103(1)(a). 
Similarly, "[a] person is guilty of arson if under circumstances not 
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amounting to aggravated arson, he by means of fire or explosives 
unlawfully and intentionally damages . . . the property of 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(1)(b). "Property" is 
explicitly defined as a habitable structure. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-101(1). 
Once the definition of property is incorporated into the 
arson statute, the arson and aggravated arson statutes both prohibit 
the unlawful burning of a mobile home. Compare Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-102(1) (b) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1) (a); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-101(1). Each statute prohibits damage by means of 
fire or explosives to a habitable structure and each statute 
prohibits damage done with an unlawful and intentional state of 
mind. The mens rea and actus reus proscriptions are the same. 
The prefatory phrase of the arson statute, "under 
circumstances not amounting to aggravated arson," is a phrase 
without meaning for the present case.1 Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-102(1). Under the facts involved here, no damage to a 
habitable structure could amount to arson but fall short of 
ciggravated arson. 
Since both statutes prohibited the same conduct, 
Mr. Scheel should have been received the sentence for a third degree 
1
 Though inapplicable here, a circumstance "not 
amounting to aggravated arson" could exist under a different arson 
subsection. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(1)(a) (the "defrauding an 
insurer" arson provision does not amount to aggravated arson). The 
jury instructions in the case at bar, however, stressed only the 
burning of a habitable structure. (R 52, 53). 
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felony. See State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969). 
At issue in Shondel2 was whether a felony statute or a misdemeanor 
statute governed the defendant's crime of unlawful possession of LSD 
(lysergic acid diethylamide). 453 P.2d at 147. The Court applied 
the misdemeanor statute, reasoning: "where there is doubt or 
uncertainty as to which of two punishments is applicable to an 
offense, an accused is entitled to the benefit of the lesser." Id. 
at 148; cf. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985) ("the 
criminal laws must be written so that there are significant 
differences between offenses and so that the exact same conduct is 
not subject to different penalties depending upon which of two 
statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge"). 
Rodney Scheel should also have received3 the lesser of 
two potentially applicable punishments. Because the damage to the 
2
 The Shondel doctrine focuses on whether the involved 
conduct was proscribed by more than one statute, and not simply on 
whether the elements of the greater offense were proven. See State 
v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 265 (Utah 1985) (opinion denying petition 
for rehearing) (emphasis added) (if "the defendant could have been 
convicted under either [potentially applicable statute] for 
precisely the same act, . . . " the Shondel doctrine still applies); 
see also id. at 2 64 (Hall, C.J., concurring) (even though "[t]he 
facts of this case amply support[ed] the conviction of [the greater 
offense, the sentence was overturned] . . . because the Legislature 
[had not made] any distinction between the elements of the [greater 
and lesser offenses]"). 
3
 Rodney Scheel was convicted initially of aggravated 
arson, a first degree felony. (R 65); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103. 
The trial court then entered a judgment of conviction for a second 
degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402, and sentenced 
him to, inter alia, an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years. 
(R 85). The Shondel doctrine still applies because the punishment 
under either conviction may still be greater than the penalty for a 
third degree felony conviction. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203(1)-(3). 
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mobile trailer home was less than $5,000, (R 85), his prison term 
should not have exceeded a zero to five year indeterminate term. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-102(3)(b), 76-3-203(3). 
Although the Shondel doctrine was not raised below, this 
Court "may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e);4 cf. State 
v.Babbel. 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 47, 49 (Utah 1991) ("because an illegal 
sentence is void, a trial court may correct an illegal sentence at 
any time"). By remanding this case for resentencing, Mr. Scheel 
still receives a penalty proscribed by law, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203(3), albeit exclusive of his right to a new trial.5 In 
short, even if there was a crime, the sentence imposed by the trial 
court and the discretion exercised by the Board of Pardons should 
not result from a mislabelled conviction. See id. at 48 (quoting 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980) ("An erroneous 
judgment of conviction is as much an affront to society's interest 
in the fair administration of justice as it is to an individual's 
4
 Cf. Utah R. Evid 103(d) (courts may take notice of 
plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not 
brought to the attention of the lower court); Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) 
(notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned 
to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice"). 
5
 In the event this Court addresses the Shondel issue, 
Mr. Scheel concedes, for purposes of resentencing, the 
appropriateness of the third degree arson conviction. Cf. State v. 
Bolsincrer. 699 P. 2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985) (a new trial is not 
required if the defendant consents to a reduction and the elements 
of the included offense were necessarily proven); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402(5). 
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rights")). The sentence for a third degree arson conviction should 
have been imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction for lack of evidence, or, in the alternative, reverse 
his conviction and remand for resentencing with instructions to 
enter a judgment of conviction for arson, a third degree felony. 
SUBMITTED this A l day of May, 1991. 
M-^ 
RONALD )S . SFU{JIN0 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
UML> 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this day of May, 1991. 
D S > F U J I N RONALD . v I O 
DELIVERED by 
t h i s day o f May, 1 9 9 1 , 
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ADDENDUM A 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-402 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included of-
fense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used-
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the feiony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sen-
tence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run con-
secutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
76-3-4UZ. uonviction or lower category or onense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and charac-
ter of the defendant, concludes that it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that category of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, 
the court may, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, enter a judgment 
of conviction for the next lower category of offense and impose sentence ac-
cordingly. 
76-6-101. Definitions. 
For purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Property" means any form of real property or tangible personal 
property which is capable of being damaged or destroyed and includes a 
habitable structure. 
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, trailer, railway 
car, aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging or assembling persons or con-
ducting business whether a person is actually present or not. 
(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone other than the actor has a 
possessory or proprietary interest in any portion thereof. 
76-6-102. Arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of arson if under circumstances not amounting to 
aggravated arson, he by means of fire or explosives unlawfully and intention-
ally damages: 
(a) any property with intention of defrauding an insurer; or 
(b) the property of another. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is: 
(a) a second degree felony if the damage caused exceeds $5,000 value; 
(b) a third degree felony if the damage caused exceeds $1,000 but is not 
more than $5,000 value; 
(c) a class A misdemeanor if the damage caused exceeds $250 but is not 
more than $1,000 value; and 
(d) a class B misdemeanor if the damage caused is $250 or less. 
76-6-103. Aggravated arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives 
he intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the 
offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Rule 19 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating dis-
tinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Not-
withstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions 
in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
